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Articles posted by Radical Socialist on various issues.

Khagragarh: The Communalisation of Security Threats, the Targeting of Communities

Khagragarh: The Communalisation of Security Threats, the Targeting of Communities

 

Certain things stand out with clarity over the Khagragarh incident and its follow up. Two political parties, the TMC, ruling West Bengal, and the BJP, ruling at the Centre, are both bent on using it primarily, indeed almost entirely, for their party political agenda. And there is a real security issue – not just for India, but even more for Bangladesh.

 

The Bangladesh connection and South Asian Politics:

It is necessary to understand clearly and fully, the nature of the Bangladesh connection. The history of the Eastern part of Bengal, and its transformations, have much to do with how strong communalism becomes in the sub-continent as a whole. Bengal was a Muslim majority area, where, during the British colonial rule,  the main Indian exploiting class that developed was mainly Hindu – the new zamindars of numerous layers. Connected to them was an emerging urban social layer, the bhadralok. Mainly Hindu, mainly upper caste (with a few notable exceptions), these people became the most important indigenous social layer in Bengal under British rule. Administrators, landed middle class people and especially their urbanized segment, and the intelligentsia generally, were all put together under the term bhadralok. The rise of the bhadralok is considered to be the most significant intellectual trend in Bengal and among the most significant for India in general. At the same time, the majority of the peasants were Muslims. So a communal dimension could enter class conflicts.

This was further compounded by how the Bengali bhadralok intelligentsia articulated their nationalism. Cultural constructions of the nation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw, quite often, the nation being imagined in Hindu terms, using Hindu imageries, and sometimes with Muslims being portrayed as the opponents of the nation.  In one of the most famous cases, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay’s Anandamath,  the early thrust on anti-British action was edited later and turned more into an anti-Muslim thrust, and the past, present and future of the country was imagined as three visions of a goddess. Even the campaign against the partition of 1905 involved actions that on occasions looked only after the interests of this minority elite section – for example the opposition to setting up a separate university in Dhaka after the partition was rescinded.

The last significant attempt by a Bengali Hindu leader of the Congress to forge a national/regional identity without religious division was the Bengal Pact, initiated by C.R. Das. Within a short time after the death of Das, the provincial Congress leaders overturned it. Subsequently, when A. K. Fazlul Haque’s Krishak-Praja Party elbowed out the Muslim League in the elections of 1937 from the Muslim reserved seats, class considerations were crucial in the Congress not collaborating with them (Haque’s party was pro well-to-do peasants and jotedars, while the Congress at the provincial level was dominated by zamindars). The communalisation of Bengal politics, in other words, was at least as much the work of Hindu communalists (if not more) as of Muslim communalists. However, in 1946 it was the Muslim League, which through its Direct Action Day, sought to unify Muslim opinion behind it.

The creation of Pakistan, however, had more complex consequences. On one hand, there was a strong communal identity. By 1956 Pakistan proclaimed itself to be an Islamic Republic. Riots had recurred. All the way to 1971, Hindus were targeted. As a result, there were repeated influx of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan to India (close to 52-55 lakhs between 1947-1971, including the about 15 lakhs who did not return out of the over one crore of people of all communities who had come in 1971). On the other hand, the goal of constructing a homogeneous Pakistani Muslim identity led to the attempt to impose Urdu as the language of Pakistan. In fact, Urdu was not the language of any of the provinces of Pakistan. The struggle over the language would initiate a revival of Bengali nationalism.

 

Jinnah, the leader of Pakistan, had insisted that Urdu must be the language of all Pakistanis. Students in Dhaka University, with covert work by the Communist Party, led the struggle against this. On 21 February, 1952, this resulted in firing and the death of students. After years of unrest, the Pakistan Government finally accepted Bengali as a national language in 1956. But they persisted in oppressing the Bengali speakers. The cyclone of 1970 and the devastations caused in East Pakistan showed that Bengali speaking Pakistanis were not equals, a perception strengthened when Yahya Khan refused to hand over power to the Awami League in 1971, though it won a majority of the seats in Parliament. In the 300 member Provincial Assembly, they won 288 seats, and in the 300 member Parliament, they won 160 seats, with Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party, with a pseudo-socialist rhetoric, got 81 seats (none in the East). Despite this, the military regime of Yahya Khan refused to accept an Awami League government.

This may sound ancient history, but all this has contemporary resonance. Nurul Amin, Ghulam Azam, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi were among those who opposed the Awami League. An explicit Islamic identity was the basis on which many of these people collaborated with the military government, including in assisting its criminal activities after the military crackdown. Subsequently, the overthrow of Mujibur Rahman by a military coup made it possible for sections of these forces to creep back into legality and legitimacy, a legitimacy further confirmed when the Zia government in 1977 amended the founding principles to replace “secularism” by faith in Allah as a constitutional principle. In 1988, General Ershad declared Islam as the state religion. On the other hand, the restoration of democracy has seen a revival of the struggle for secularism, both by forces which had been active in the 1971 struggle, and then, during the Shahbag movement, by younger generation activists. It was the Shahbag movement which fought for the conviction of the criminals of 1971. But the communal forces are also quite strong, and as a result of the ideological  as well as organisational decimation of the Left, have considerable base among the toiling people too.

Muslim communalism in Bangladesh has taken on violent forms over the years. Verdicts against Ghulam Azam, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi and others have been met by violent protests. Jamaat-e-Islami and other communal organisations, which have historically opposed the creation of Bangladesh and rejected the idea of a Bengali identity, have used all forms, including terrorist activities.

With 90% of the Bangladesh population as Muslims, it should be evident that the struggle for secularism is also being waged by Muslims there. But violence on Hindu and other minorities is a trademark of the communalists there, since they try to use these to consolidate an aggressive Muslim identity, rather than a secular Bengali identity. However, the Shahbag movement and the role of the Awami League government (including its going ahead with elections despite the BNP-led boycott in early 2014) has put these forces on the defensive.  It is under these circumstances that they have turned to shelters in India and making bombs and other weapons there.

The revelations that have come since the Khagragarh explosion a month back tend to suggest that the manufacture of bombs was aimed at Bangladeshi targets, including possibly top Bangladeshi political leaders. And this also shows, that while India has always complained about neighbouring countries sheltering real or alleged terrorists in camps within their borders, India has been sheltering such elements.

The communalisation of West Bengal politics

In the West Bengal Assembly elections of 2011, the BJP had won 4% votes. In 2014, during the parliamentary elections, this rose to over 16%. With the TMC holding on to its vote share, the BJP votes came at the expense of the parliamentary Left. This has to do with many factors. But certainly, one very important factor is the successful communalisation of politics in West Bengal, in which the BJP and the TMC are both participating with great gusto.

For the BJP, all Muslims are assumed to be suspects. For the BJP, migration from Bangladesh comes in two forms – if the migrant is a Hindu then he/she is a religious refugee but if the migrant is a Muslim then he/she is considered to be an infiltrator. That there can also be migrations driven by economic hardships are not acknowledged.

What is even more dangerous is the game the BJP government has played. Now, after the bomb explosions, the NIA has been called in. But the Modi government has been installed some months now. So it cannot pretend that it is not answerable. It is being claimed that regular trips were made between India and Bangladesh by the people arrested or their bosses, in Khagragarh. With the Central Government being responsible for the border, the Modi government cannot escape its responsibilities.

Instead of looking at the struggle between secular democratic forces and their rightwing opponents in a neighbouring country, what the BJP government has done is, started a blame game against the West Bengal Government, and attempted to further raise the communal pitch in West Bengal. Ever since the Khagragarh incident, the target has become the Muslim community of West Bengal, as if all Muslims everywhere are responsible for the terroristic activity of a rightwing group.

This of course ties in with the BJPs overall thrust. It denies that Hindu rightwing politics can also be terroristic. Since coming to power, the Modi government has been taking actions to ensure that those of the Hindutva-right accused of terrorism, or any kind of violence, get off.

At this point, we also need to highlight the fact that all the hue and cry in defence of the NIA is a further attack on human rights. Whether a person is accused of being a thief, a murder, a tax-evader or a terrorist, she or he should have equal rights with all others. That is because you are not guilty just because the police is bringing charges against you, to say nothing of trial by media. And increasingly, the label “terrorist” has been used to arrest people, to get dubious confessions from people, to create special law courts where the defendants find their legal rights curtailed or simply ignored. The UAPA Amendment and the creation of the NIA fall under such activities. That is why, to demand that not the local police, but the NIA must be called in, cannot be a communist stance. Rather, the demand must be for proper use of law by the state police.

The parliamentary elections of 2014 showed that West Bengal has both potentials for the BJP as well as problems. TMC, another deeply rightwing party is in power in West Bengal, and like the BJP, this party is also willing to use rightwing tactics to retain power. However, its specific tactical line is very different. In the last stage of the 2014 elections, the TMC practically stopped talking about its principal adversary i.e. CPI(M), as it seemed to have realised the way things were moving, and campaigned against only the BJP. It did so, by seeking to consolidate a Muslim vote by favouring Muslim communalism. There is a considerable difference between supporting and protecting a minority, and aiding any kind of communalism, including minority communalism. This is precisely what the TMC did. This probably enabled it to consolidate the bulk of Muslim voters behind it. But this also gave the BJP a handle. In the past, for all its faults, including occasional compromises with Muslim  communal forces (for example over the demand for expelling Taslima Nasreen from West Bengal) the CPI(M) led Left Front government did not take such blatant stances of the type taken by the TMC. On the other hand, the Left had in the past seen the issue of refugees as a matter of human rights rather than in religious terms. Refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan had fought for resettlement under Left leadership. The coming to power of a Left Front Government had changed that. Refugees settled very badly in Madhya Pradesh sought to come to West Bengal and were terribly attacked in Marich Jhanpi. Nonetheless, the older generation had been settled, and had got some stakes. A kind of social democratic balancing act had been done. The TMC’s blatant siding with Muslim communal forces to win elections pushed a section of the former refugee voter in the direction of Hindutva forces. In addition, the rightward drift of the CPI(M) has meant it is increasingly unable to provide a militant radical line that attacks communalisms of all shades while putting forward real alternatives. With its succumbing to the neoliberal strategies, at best offering what has been called “social liberalism"(liberalism with a few sops) it has tended to become less and less central.

So, we argue, it is not a matter of fact that all Muslims are terrorists, or even that all terrorists are Muslims. Rightwing terrorism is tied up with the overall politics of rightwing parties.  The politics that Amit Shah espouses, the politics that has brought the BJP absolute control in Gujarat, these too were and are politics of violence, of terrorising people. Gujarat pogrom of 2002, Kandhamal, these are cases of use of terror on a minority community to consolidate the majority on a communal-fascist project. That does not make all Hindus, or even all BJP voters terrorists.

The fact is, the TMC has been going soft on these forces, including going to the extent of trying to destroy evidences, because it believes that all Muslims can be mobilised by supporting Muslim communalism. The BJP has also been targeting all Muslims, in the hope that by doing so, it can gather support from all Hindus on the basis that they are Hindus, rather than on class basis, or on any progressive social basis.

The response to this lies in fighting for  a series of issues.

On the question of terrorism and violence, we demand that it is not by special laws, but by proper application of normal laws, which are adequate, that real culprits be apprehended. We oppose the assumption of guilt by religious identity.

At the same time, we argue that to fight the BJP, the TMC is not an option. It is necessary to oppose the neoliberal agenda, of which the BJP government is now the leading proponent. But to do so, it is not useful to rely on a right wing regime that can only occasionally hand out doles to selected supporters and funds to clubs, etc. Instead, we need to build a militant alternative that will fight for extension rather than demolition of MNREGA, that will fight for minimum wages as per the 15th ILC norms, oppose GMOs, oppose privatisation of healthcare and fight for bringing more of health and education back under state expenditure and control. It is by looking after real social needs that we can undercut the insidious ways in which both communalisms try to gather followers.

Protest against the illegal arrest, harassment and brutal behaviour of West Bengal Police administration and ruling party supported goons

Press Release
Osongothito Khetra Shramik Sangrami Mancha


 
Protest against the illegal arrest, harassment and brutal behaviour of  West Bengal Police administration and ruling party supported goons
 


We strongly protest the illegal arrest, harassment and brutal behaviour of West Bengal Police administration along with ruling party supported goons against the Civic Police Volunteers in particular and unorganised sector workers as a whole.
 The members of West Bengal Civic Police Association of Malda district including state president Sanjoy Poria assembled near Malda Town Hall to give deputation to the SP and DM of Malda district today. Prior to this they  informed the SP, DM, and IC of English Bazar Police Station of todays programme. The Civic Polices of  Malda district were dismissed illegally. In spite of the fact that  the GO no. 1940-PL/PB/3P-31/12 dated14.07.2014, clearly mentioned that only the old list of Civic Police Volunteers have to be enrolled for the re-appointment of Civic Police.


The dismissed Civic Police of Malda wrote letters to the respective Police Stations, SP of Malda protesting the dismissal. They moved writ petition to Calctta High Court. The Court  ordered the SP of Malda  on 5th, 19th & 25th of Sept. 2014 either to reinstate them or explain why they are not elligible for the job of Civic Police within 4 week time. Today more than 150 Civic Police assembled in a meeting with prior intimation to the administration to give deputation to DM and SP with prior appointment. After they assembled, without any reason the police arrested more than 140 Civic Police and confined them in Eglish Bazar Police Station. Two of them namely Mahesh Saha and Musaraf Hossen were severely beaten up by the police and became seriously ill. They were taken to the Hospital by the police in haste.
Just two days before on 29 October the Civic Police Association of Hooghly district organised a meeting at Arambagh Bus Terminal giving prior information to SP, DM and IC Arambagh Police Station. When 300 of them assembled there the  armed goons of ruling party surround them and threatened them for dire consequences. Tha President of Hooghly district unit Subroto Hazra was confined till 7 pm and severly beaten up. Earlier Ramchandra Poria father of Sanjay Poria of Keshpur Police Station was threatened by armed goons of local ruling party to burn their house and belongings if Sanjay got involved in movement of Civic Police.


The West Bengal Civic Police Association is a member of The  'Osongothito Khetra Sramik Sangrami Mancha'. The Mancha has decided to organised a public meeting in Kolkata on 11-11-2014 to highlight various demands of unorganised sectors workers and the undemocratic situation prevailing in the state. The administration and the ruling party out of fear continuously  trying to disrupt the meeting. We demand:

  • Immediate release of all the arrested Civic Police.
  • Immediate reinstatement of dismissed Civic Police following Hon'be Calcutta High Court Order.
  • Stop harassment and vicitimisation of Civic Police.
  • Ensure guarantee of constitutional right of  'Right to Association'.

 
(Swapan Ganguly                                                                                                                         Somenath Ghosh)
                                          for Osongothito Khetra Shramik Sangrami Mancha                 

Hong Kong protests demand democracy

Hong Kong protests demand democracy

HONGKONG-CHINA-POLITICS-DEMOCRACY

By MICHAEL SCHREIBER

Hong Kong is witnessing the most massive street protests in its history. Many thousands of people have stood up to police repression while maintaining an Occupy-style presence in the streets. The protests have become known as the “Umbrella Revolution” for the umbrellas that demonstrators have employed to help shield their faces from tear gas thrown by police.

The protesters’ main demand is for democratic suffrage rights—for citizens of Hong Kong to have the full ability to choose their chief executive, in opposition to the Aug. 29 edict of the Chinese government that would require any candidates for the office to be vetted by Chinese authorities. The protesters are also demanding the resignation of the current chief executive, Leung Chun-ying, since he has presided over the police attacks on the demonstrations.

The mobilization began on Sept. 22 as a student boycott of classes. Two days later, about 10,000 students marched from the university of Hong Kong to the major government buildings. There is no doubt that the violent police attack on the demonstrators, over the weekend of Sept. 27-28, only served to swell the number of demonstrators, since popular outrage quickly mounted. By Sept. 29, crowds estimated as approaching 180,000 people, predominately students, were in the streets. In some localities, barricades were erected for defense.

Sean Starrs, an assistant professor at the City University of Hong Kong, wrote an eye-witness account of the police violence in the Canadian on-line publication The Bullet (http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1042.php): “The main organizer of the week-long boycott of classes, the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), had planned on ending the strike and sit-in in front of the government buildings on Friday evening [Sept. 26], but late that night some 200 or so students stormed a police line and fence to occupy a square within the government complex. The police reacted violently with batons and pepper spray, making over 70 arrests, including one of the most high profile student leaders, 17 year-old Joshua Wong, co-founder of the mostly high school student group Scholarism.

“As news of the violent police repression swiftly spread, masses of students and other supporters poured into the whole area, eventually blocking major roads (on Monday afternoon there were still some abandoned BMWs and public buses in the middle of the road surrounded by throngs of students).”

Starrs wrote that “the riot police were formally taken off the streets by noon Monday, officially because the ‘illegal protesters’ have ‘mostly calmed down.’ In reality, the riot police were the ones that calmed down once they realized they could not defeat the students. During the climax of repression on Sunday night, I was in one area that was tear gassed around 4-5 times (each barrage with multiple canisters) in only two hours. The police formed two lines and fired tear gas in order to advance toward the epicenter in Admiralty [an area of government buildings], after which most of the crowd would flee and then quickly regroup, surrounding the police on both sides with hands in the air to show non-violent intent.”

The gesture of hands in the air, together with the chant “Hands up!” was borrowed by the demonstrators from the scenes that they witnessed on social media of people in Ferguson, Mo., and other U.S. cities who were protesting the police murder of Michael Brown.

Some unions responded with calls for workers’ solidarity actions. Starrs reported, “The Confederation of Trade Unions and the Professional Teachers Union both called on its members to strike in support of the students. At least 1,000 social workers, high school and university teachers joined the strike, as well as pupils from at least 31 schools. HKFS extended the student class boycott indefinitely. The Chairperson of Swire Beverages Employees General Union, distributor of Coca Cola in Hong Kong, announced to cheering students in Admiralty that more than 200 workers joined the strike, while 100 more reduced their hours. There were also reports of some taxi drivers striking.”

In calling for its members to participate in a Sept. 29 strike, the Confederation of Trade Unions demanded that police release all of the demonstrators who had been detained. The federation’s statement read in part: “Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) strongly condemns the police for their violent attack on unarmed students and people. We strongly condemn the government for suppressing the freedom of speech and the freedom of assembly in Hong Kong. HKCTU calls for all workers in Hong Kong to strike tomorrow, in protest of the ruling of the National People’s Congress, as well as the brutal suppression of peaceful protest by the Hong Kong government. Workers and students must unite to force the totalitarian government to hand state power back to the people. …

“Workers must stand up against the unjust government and violent suppression. Workers must stand up, as the totalitarian government has to back down when all workers protest in solidarity. To defend democracy and justice, we cannot let the students fight the suppression alone.”
Hong Kong’s current governmental system was established in 1997, when the former British colony was restored to China. The official mantra at the time was “one country, two systems.” This slogan could be understood in two ways: first, that Hong Kong might remain relatively “democratic” (in bourgeois terms) as opposed to China’s authoritarian regime, and secondly, in reference to the fact that the Chinese economic system had been that of a Stalinized and highly bureaucratized workers’ state, while Hong Kong was a capitalist financial center.

Even by then, however, the “Communist” bureaucrats had already begun a restoration of capitalism in mainland China, with bargain handovers of state resources and industry to the burgeoning capitalist class together with a steep reduction of social services to working people. The Chinese rulers saw the advantages of using Hong Kong’s financial institutions as an open door to facilitate the entry of foreign capital into the mainland.

Today, there is no real difference in essential economic terms between the systems of Hong Kong and the rest of China, while the fiction of Hong Kong’s being “democratic” has been torn away for all to see. Nevertheless, the current protests come at a worrisome time for the Chinese Communist Party, whose top echelons are concerned over indications of economic slowdown and increasing popular discontent.

This has magnified the fear of party bureaucrats that the Hong Kong protests might get “out of hand” and spread to workers throughout China. This was reflected in the editorial issued by Beijing’s official People’s Daily on Oct. 4, which stated, “For the minority of people who want to foment a ‘color revolution’ on the mainland by way of Hong Kong, this is but a daydream.”

Sean Starrs points out, “With President Xi Jinping’s ‘anti-corruption campaign’ so far targeting only his rival factions, the CCP is currently in the midst of the one of the most serious tests to its unity in decades. More broadly vis-à-vis the Chinese people, the CCP is increasingly using nationalism and China’s ‘glorious’ past, including reviving Confucianism, once reviled by the CCP as a product of feudal and patriarchal authoritarianism, in order to replace ‘communist’ ideology.

“Indeed, the CCP announced that class struggle was officially over in China, and therefore removed the right to strike from its constitution in 1982. Yet, since especially the Nanhai Honda strike in 2010, there have been hundreds if not thousands of increasingly daring strikes across China, the largest of which was earlier this year when 40,000 workers at a Dongguan shoe factory went on strike, less than 100 km north of Hong Kong. …”

“Hence, especially over the past ten years, burgeoning social unrest in China seems to be increasingly rattling the upper echelons of the CCP. Since 2009 China spends more on domestic security than external military defense. And the CCP has reacted to the Umbrella Revolution with record Internet censorship on the Mainland, banning many search words such as “Class boycott,” “Occupy Central,” “Hong Kong police,” and “Hong Kong tear gas …”

While Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung has raised the threat of police action to completely clear the streets, Beijing appears hesitant to go further by sending Peoples Liberation Army units into Hong Kong, fearing that brutal repression would only spread the revolt. Their hope is that moderate elements among the protesters might be utilized to “calm things down.”

Participation in the pro-democracy demonstrations surged in early October in response to counter-demonstrations that had been whipped up by the media and violent attacks by thugs and criminals. By Monday, Oct. 6, however, the ranks of protesters appeared to have thinned considerably. Civil service employees were allowed to pass through barricades and return to their jobs.

Liberal and authoritative figures have been utilized to urge the protesters to dismantle their camps and go home. For example, in a commentary for Radio Free Asia, Bao Tong, the most senior Chinese official jailed over his sympathy for the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, praised the protesters but told them: “The seeds have already been sown, and they need time to lie fallow … Take a break, for the sake of future room to grow. For tomorrow.”

The Wall Street Journal reported on Oct. 5 that leaders of the movement are certainly feeling the pressure: “For much of Sunday, leaders of two student groups and activist movement Occupy Central were holed up in meetings to form a strategy on whether to call off or continue protests before the start of the workweek Monday…

“Late Sunday evening [Oct. 5], the Hong Kong Federation of Students [HKFS], one of the organizers, said the pro-democracy demonstrations would continue but that it would start discussions with the government to prepare for official talks.” At the same time, in an attempt to distance itself from more determined protesters, HKFS leaders made it clear that in their view the “Umbrella Revolution” was “not a revolution” at all.

In the meantime, the United States has brazenly inserted itself into the situation, with high-level U.S. officials backing the call for “dialogue” between Hong Kong authorities and protesters. Hoping in the process to score a few points against Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “As China knows, we support universal suffrage in Hong Kong … We believe an open society with the highest possible degree of autonomy and governed by rule of law is essential for Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.” Of course, in other situations around the globe, Kerry has had no difficulties in hobnobbing with dictators who flout the principle of universal suffrage.

U.S. imperialism has nothing to offer the people in the streets who are fighting for democratic rights. Democracy can only be won by resolute and uncompromising struggle against both the governmental authorities and the international corporations and banks that control Hong Kong.

What has not yet come to pass in Hong Kong is the formation of a central leadership that can unite all the disparate groupings within the protests, and proceed with a clear perspective of how to advance the struggle. Ultimately, Chinese workers and their allies both in Hong Kong and the mainland must build a mass working-class party, armed with a full program for the working class to take political power in a socialist revolution.

Photo: Hong Kong protesters raise their hands in the “Hands Up!” gesture popularized in U.S. protests over the Ferguson, Mo., police shooting of Michael Brown. Alex Ogle / Getty Images

Second life sentence handed down to Baba Jan and Iftikhar Hussain

Second life sentence handed down to Baba Jan and Iftikhar Hussain

 

Wednesday 29 October 2014, by Farooq Tariq

 

For instigating prisoners to protest against inhuman conditions, Baba Jan and Iftikhar Hussain get second life imprisonments.

Baba Jan and Iftikhar Hussain were sentenced for a second time to life imprisonment by the Anti Terrorist Court in Gilgit today in another case.

They were charged with instigating prisoners in Gilgit Jail to protest against inhuman treatment of jail authorities while Baba Jan was in jail for two years.

This was a fact.

He led a movement of the prisoners to demand just treatment for all those in jail according to he jail manual for prisoners. He demanded to provide healthy food, meat twice a week, milk, fresh bread and tea twice a day and all that was written as a right of prisoners.

He also demanded proper health facilities and doctor visit to all bantams on regular basis.

After the successful upsurge in the prison during 2011, which united for the first time Shia and Sunni prisoners, the jail authorities were forced to accept the demands and for weeks prisoners were provided food and health facilities according to the jail manuals.

He and Iftikhar Husain were framed in another case while they were in prison for instigating prisoners under terrorist laws.

Today both got the second life imprisonments in this case.

Baba Jan is known as Bhaghat Singh of the valley. Bhaghat Singh, a freedom fighter against British colonial rule also led a movement for prisoners right to decent treatment.

May be Baba Jan and Iftikhar are the first political prisoners in Pakistan and Gilgit Beltistan history who got a life imprisonment for taking up the case of worsening prisoners rights.

He led the peaceful movement in which no physical attacks were made on any prison officials. Prisoners just refused to cooperate.

Awami Workers Party condemns this second life imprisonment to Baba Jan and Iftikhar. We want to make it absolute clear, there is no going back.

The PPP regime in Gilgit can go to any length hand in hand with scaled judiciary to punish the political activists but this will not break the will of Baba Jan and his comrades to change the system and with setting up examples of hardship and sacrifices.

Long live Baba Jan, Iftikhar Hussain and their comrades !

We will not leave you alone !

A national and international solidarity campaign will continue!

Farooq Tariq

Farooq Tariq is the general secretary of the Awami Workers’ Party formed in 2012 by the coming together of three existing parties. He was previously the national spokesperson of Labour Party Pakistan, http://www.laborpakistan.org/.

What Ghulam Azam Wrought

What Ghulam Azam Wrought

Sushovan Dhar

The struggle against the Razakars is shifting to a new phase; the outcome will profoundly affect Bangladesh

A year ago, Ghulam Azam was sentenced to 90 years of imprisonment. Turning down prosecutors’ appeal for the death penalty, he was spared due to his age. However, age did not spare him a year later. The death of this persona terrible raises several pertinent questions about the future of his brand of politics.

What would its impacts be in the short and medium terms? What ramifications are likely to extend across the South Asian region? His death has, of course, not orphaned his political child. And, its too premature to predict its course, since much of it depends on collective efforts more than Ghulam’s demise.

Many a protester, primarily the students and the youth, were seen triumphant, organising sporadic marches celebrating Ghulam’s passing. That was certainly not unnatural or unexpected given his role during the Bangladesh liberation war. He evoked memories of the massacres which killed countless people, raped thousands of women, rendered many homeless, and turned innocent children orphans.

The Butcher of Bangladesh would have put any butcher to shame. Certainly, the young, celebrating brigade, at times exhibiting signs of zealotry and hyper-jubilation, can’t be held responsible for being unruly towards this particular deceased. They are expressing a sense of relief about those dark days and the shadows of the horror which Ghulam Azam essentially symbolised. Even so, a deeper concern still exists about the malady that he was able to successfully strengthen and spread. The current euphoria surrounding his death must gear up to resist it appropriately.

The religious-right asserts

Historically, religious politics surfaced immediately in the post-liberation days, gaining momentum after Ziaur Rahman’s coup d’etat, and acquiring complete ascendancy during the Ershad era. It can hardly be doubted that this dire emergence of Islamic fundamentalist forces has wedged the country towards an extremely grievous situation that is capable of pushing the nation towards an ugly civil war.

This painful journey from Bengali nationalism to an Islamic state has included endless attacks and hostility towards religious minorities, women, and also against the progressive and secular sections of the society; all in the name of religion. Savage actions have claimed lives. The innocent and the lower strata of the society have been the worst victims. And to add to this, the rise of religious fundamentalism has had severe impacts on the overall security of the country and the region. This insidious growth of religious fundamentalism has violated the four cardinal founding principles of Bangladesh: Nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy.

Bangladesh is caught in a mess from which it needs to extricate itself. The death of Ghulam Azam or a few others would not reverse the situation automatically. Neither would the hanging of leading collaborators bring any short-term solution. There is a need to seek a long-term solution to this problem which is deeply afflicting Bangladesh as well as the South Asian region. Competing fundamentalisms raise mutual hostility but emerge with reciprocity, jointly victorious.

South Asia

Pakistan’s 2013 elections brought Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League to power. His victory legitimised right-wing politics, and religious fanatics took advantage. Radical Islamic groups and networks, which were earlier banned, resurfaced once again – both covertly and overtly. The Pakistani state, which had earlier been an onlooker, is now a bystander. Women, human rights, and secularism activists, and free-thinking individuals including journalists are bearing the worst.

There are thousands of Malalas in the North-West Frontier Province now, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, where fundamentalists have gained control. The country is sitting on a simmering volcano ready to erupt. In the midst of this sinister condition, people are left alone to bank on their fate. Lives are squeezed out mercilessly, and the living are lumped with the dead.

A reinforcement of right-wing politics afflicts the big brother, India. Narendra Modi’s ascendancy at the helm of national politics vitalised Hinduvta which had earlier been in the sidelines. A series of attacks on the members of the minority communities had set off after the elections. People were polarised along communal faultlines and exclusive religious identities provide fertile grounds for Hindu religious fundamentalism.

Camouflaged under a nationalist garb, the Hindutva brigade attempts to break the founding pillars of multiculturalism though various means: Manipulation of socio-cultural identities, defining nationalism using communal identities, and using the media and exploiting civil society organisations and institutions.

The rank corruption and inefficiency of the previous Congress-led government added fire to the fuel. While we witness the resurgence of fascist Hinduvta politics, the BJP-led government is the latest protagonist of neo-liberal politics trying to wipe out previous gains made by the poor, the marginalised, and the working class.

The common feature in all religious fundamentalisms across the region is that it stresses on a dogmatic adherence to tradition and “glorious” history as a way out of the poverty and drudgery that millions of sub-continental masses are trapped in. We frequently hear about a certain mythical “golden era” to which society must return.

Upholding orthodoxy that breeds inflexibility and a rejection of modern society, Islamic fundamentalists utilise the imagery of the “golden era of Islam” as a respite from the misery, the poverty, and other social problems we face.

What is to be done?

While religious fundamentalists, and the dangers posed by them, walk the ramps, we can’t afford to sit back, limiting ourselves to commentary and watch society be torn apart. Our inaction will only embolden them. Let us remember that fundamentalism is a political challenge that can’t be countered administratively only. While condemning violence, terror, and the attacks it unleashes on society we must develop strategies to respond to it.

Along with opposing fanaticism and defending victims of religious fundamentalism, an alternative agenda to empower the toiling masses needs to be brought to the centre-stage. Religious fundamentalism, or any other type of extreme communitarian politics, and exclusive cultural nationalism use the already existing discrimination and graded inequalities as fertile breeding grounds to further their interests.

A punitive measure alone would hardly suffice. Sincere considerations and remedies of distress, misery, and the penury in which the masses are immersed, are long-term antidotes which can effectively work.

The state should have no business with religion, as religious states can never handle religious fanatics meaningfully. The struggle against the Razakars is shifting to a new phase; the outcome of which will profoundly affect the future course of secularism, justice, and freedom in Bangladesh and elsewhere. This struggle is important. Let’s do it now.

 

Da’esh - Golem is turning against its creator

From International Viewpoint

Tuesday 14 October 2014, by Michel Warschawski

The United States is once more experiencing the reality of this old Jewish saying. Supporting the most fundamentalist Muslims in Afghanistan in the hope of putting and end to Soviet influence, finding itself a few years later confronted with a total war against al-Qaida and its cloudy international, and whose result will be far from being a victory. In the background is the, always mistaken, idea that the enemies of my enemies are my friends. Back in the 1930s, the “democratic” countries thought that Hitler could be an ally against the communist danger. We know what happened then…

The State of Israel has also played this game, encouraging in the 1980s the growth of the Hamas Islamists against the nationalists of the PLO. We know what happened then as well. Today it is with Da’esh (IS, ISIS or ISIL) that the USA and their allies are having the same experience: this by-product of al-Qaida has taken on an importance which has surprised the Pentagon strategists and CIA experts, and is threatening to destroy the architecture of the Middle-East, put in place almost a century ago, by Messrs Sykes and Picot, at the time when the Ottoman Empire had become the “sick man of Europe”.

It is important to underline that it as Saudi Arabia, great ally of the United States in the Middle East, that created al-Qaida – and thus, indirectly, Da’esh – in its war against increasing Iranian influence in the Middle-East. Its radically fundamentalist Wahhabist Islam was the ideological school of this movement. The Golem has now turned against its creators.

Recently on the far left in Europe, I have heard expressions of support for Da’esh. There again, the enemy of my enemy (USA) supposedly would be my ally. A serious mistake: there is nothing progressive in Da’esh, even when they are fighting against the United States and their allies. It is a barbarian invasion that not only sows death and the destruction, but commits itself publicly and openly to imposing an Islamic regime, in its most rigorous interpretation, with all that that implies in terms of public freedoms, women’s rights and non-observance of the rights of minorities.

Political combat is not a football game, where one must support a team because one does not like the other one. There are cases where we are facing two plagues, of which neither is better than the other.

The United States stop carrying out their dirty wars in the Middle East, the international community stops being an accessory to Israel’s colonial policy, and Da’esh will lose the popular support it has in certain layers of the Muslim world. It is as simple as that .

Published in the Courrier de Genève (October 2014)

Making sense of postcolonial theory: a response to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Making sense of postcolonial theory: a response to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Vivek Chibber

(Originally in Cambridge Review of International Affairs online 3 Oct. 2014)


I will respond as best I can to Gayatri Spivak’s criticisms of Postcolonial theory and the specter of capital (Chibber 2013) (hereafter PTSC), though, as I will suggest below, the task is not an easy one, owing to Spivak’s peculiar style of
engagement.1


Spivak begins by castigating me for focusing narrowly on Subaltern Studies, even while I claim to critique postcolonial theory. Why do I leave out so much of what has been produced in the field? In reality, I offered an explanation in the book’s opening chapter, but, since Spivak does not address my reasons, please allow me to repeat them. The decision to focus on Subaltern Studies was not arbitrary. I was fully aware that postcolonial studies has generated a wide and varied universe of scholarship, expanding across many disciplines. My goal was to assess its contributions in the more empirically oriented fields such as history and anthropology, where it has exercised considerable influence. Hence, right at the outset, I signalled that the focus of the book was a somewhat delimited portion of what the field has to offer. I chose to focus on these areas because my interest
was in what postcolonial scholarship has to say about the social structure, politics, and historical evolution of the Global South, since its claims about these phenomena are of considerable interest, and they have been extremely influential across the academic universe.
To examine postcolonial studies in the empirical disciplines, the next challenge was to locate a central cluster of arguments that are associated with it and could be taken to embody a theory, or a research programme. In other words, I had to see if
postcolonial studies has generated a theory that explains the specific dynamics and evolution of colonial societies, or of the Global South more generally. The arguments I would focus upon not only had to have some theoretical and empirical content, but also had to have two other characteristics, if the project was to succeed—they would have to resonate with the claims being made in the wider field, even in cultural studies, and they would have to be arguments that wielded actual influence in scholarly work. Hence, focusing on arguments that had little influence, or which could not prove their bona fides as genuinely ‘postcolonial’, would undermine the project right at the outset. On these criteria, there can be little doubt that Subaltern Studies was not only a legitimate target for my project, but the most natural one.


First, it is recognized as a legitimate, even central, current of scholarship within postcolonial studies. Works by its founding members are included or discussed in the most widely used textbooks on postcolonial studies, and, just as importantly,
its members routinely describe their work as belonging to the field. Secondly, Subaltern Studies has remained committed to a stable and remarkably coherent set of propositions about the dynamics of the (post-)colonial world, its evolution over time, and the ways in which that part of the globe differs in its structure and culture from the West. In other words, it has generated a core set of arguments that can be taken as a theory and a research programme. While it is conventional to mark a break of sorts between the ‘early’ volumes in the series and the later ones, this distinction is misleading in some ways. The real core of the programme—the idea of the bourgeoisie’s failure to speak for the nation and hence of the subaltern sphere remaining a domain separate from elite culture—was announced famously in the very first volume, and has continued to serve as the foundation for the rest of the project. Much of the subsequent evolution of Subaltern Studies can be understood as a very
ambitious project to tease out the consequences of this momentous fact about colonial history.
Thirdly, the arguments associated with the Subalterns do in fact resonate with much of the larger field. Some of these are: .
An insistence on locating the specificity of the East and on examining how and why its evolution differs from that of the West.
A focus on culture and forms of consciousness as objects of study and a source of historical difference. The insistence that subaltern groups in the East operate with their own political calculus and forms of consciousness, different from that of elite
groups and from what is projected on to them by Western theory. The insistence on purging social theory of its Eurocentric bias and the claim that Western theories are heavily imbued with this bias, Marxism included.
A boilerplate scepticism towards universalizing discourse, and hence towards many of the theories emanating from the Enlightenment tradition. Scepticism towards modernizing discourses, and their defence of rationality, science, objectivity, etc.
These are all absolutely central themes for Subaltern Studies, and they are also at the very heart of postcolonial studies more generally. Indeed, the Subalternists have probably done the most of any group to give real historical and sociological
ballast to postcolonial studies. Rather than just asserting that there is an ontological divide of some kind dividing East from West, they try to provide real historical arguments for its plausibility. And the arguments they have developed have been enormously influential, especially since the late 1990s. By the turn of this century, the Subalternists were widely recognized as being the most influential of all the empirically oriented streams within the field—to the point that many of their arguments achieved the status of being encapsulated in new buzzwords, instantly recognizable—nationalism as a ‘derivative discourse’,
rescuing ‘the fragment’, the task of ‘provincializing Europe’. One could even hazard a guess that certain key concepts, which they borrowed from others, like ‘subaltern’ or ‘dominance without hegemony’, are as much associated with them as with the terms’ originators.2


In sum, while Subaltern Studies does not itself comprise postcolonial theory, it is one of the best exemplars of the latter’s core arguments. In other words, while it does not exhaust the field, it is very much representative of it. Indeed, it is more than that. I did not randomly select Subaltern Studies as but one of many exemplars of postcolonial theory. I settled on it because it is actually better argued, more coherent and more consistent than much of the rest. Thus, it is hard to find more careful arguments in postcolonial studies explicating why capitalism, and hence modernity, in the East is taken to be fundamentally different from the West, or for why the claims of universalizing theories ought to be resisted.


All this was in the introductory chapter of PTSC. Spivak may object to my reasoning, but the decision was not arbitrary, as Spivak seems to suggest. If she feels that it lacked warrant, then she is obliged to at least offer some reason for this
judgement, which she does not. The reader is left with a sense that I closed my eyes and plucked a random assortment of theorists out of the basket.


Ranajit Guha and the status of primary texts


A most significant contribution of Subaltern Studies to the development of postcolonial theory is its historical argument for why the political culture of the East is fundamentally different from that of the West. I argue that Ranajit Guha’s work is the pivot on which this argument turns, and Spivak seems to agree with my placement of him. Guha argues, famously, that the source of East – West divergence can be found in the divergent characters of the bourgeoisie in the two settings. In the paradigmatic Western experience of England and France, the bourgeoisie led a successful project to capture state power and then create an
encompassing, inclusive political culture based on the consent of the dominated classes—it strove, in his words, to ‘speak on behalf of all the nation’. In the East, however, it abandoned any such ambitions and chose to sustain its rule by political coercion, perpetuating the division between the elite and subaltern spheres. This historic failure on the part of the bourgeoisie signalled a structural mutation in capitalism as it left Western shores—a stalling of its universalizing drive. Capitalism in the colonial world failed to properly universalize, evidenced in its failure to create a consensual, liberal political order. Other Subalternists derive from this their famous conclusion that this break in capital’s universalizing drive is why theories built on the assumption of that universalization—liberalism and Marxism—cannot find purchase in the (post-)colonial world.
The argument for capital’s failed universalization is the foundation on which much of the Subalternist project rests. I show in some detail in PTSC—over the course of five chapters—that it is deeply flawed and cannot be sustained in any form. Partha Chatterjee (2013) has responded to my arguments with a quite brazen falsehood—that Guha simply does not say what I attribute to him, even though Guha makes it clear in the first 25 pages of his book that this is exactly what he is arguing, and then confirms it throughout the course of his text.3 Spivak now joins the fray with an even more novel stratagem, one that I could never have anticipated—she censures my criticism of Guha not because it is mistaken but because Guha’s work has the status of a ‘primary text’, and one does not criticize primary texts.


I read and carefully re-read Spivak’s argument here, because it seems impossible to imagine that anyone could believe what she so cavalierly announces. But there is no other way to interpret her—Spivak thinks that there is a class of scholarship, which she calls ‘primary texts’, whose members are to be are to be memorialized and interpreted, but never assessed. The task of criticism is to be reserved for something called ‘secondary texts’. What the difference is between them we are never told. But, whatever it is, Guha falls on the protected side of it. To drive the point home, Spivak asks us rhetorically, ‘Would Chibber
correct Rosa Luxemburg and DD Kosambi? No, because he knows they are primary texts’ (Spivak 2014, 190). I am not sure what to say here. Not only would I feel free to criticize Luxemburg and Kosambi, but I would be obligated to do so if their theories or their scholarship were flawed. And not only would I respect this obligation, but so have generations of scholars and activists the world over. The distinction that Spivak urges upon us, and the attitude to it endorsed by her, would shut down most of the academy. It is an essentially theological mindset, properly belonging in a church or temple, not a university.


Spivak does propose one other justification for why my criticisms of Guha are misplaced, which needs to be taken seriously. She suggests that my criticism rests on a category mistake. I criticize Guha’s argument for being empirically and theoretically flawed—his historical account of the bourgeois revolutions is unsustainable, and his understanding of capital’s universalizing mission is mistaken. Because of this, his explanation for the colonial world’s political dynamics also largely fails. Spivak offers that this is like criticizing Du Bois for calling the exodus of slaves a ‘general strike’, or criticizing Aristotle’s Poetics as
‘illogical’ (2014, 186). The Aristotle example suggests that certain kinds of criticisms are misplaced because they misunderstand the very nature of the text they interrogate. The text is not vulnerable to the criticism being levelled at it
because of the nature of its project. Spivak i right that criticism of this kind is jejune. But it should be self-evident that such is not the case in my treatment of  Guha. Guha’s arguments are eminently subject to both empirical and theoretical assessment, because they are claims about how the world works, and about the character of historical events. Hence, this defence is no more successful than the call for deference to primary texts.

Capital and capitalism, bourgeoisie and capitalists


Spivak further contends that my criticism of Guha elides the difference between capital and capitalism, and erroneously equates capitalists with the bourgeoisie. Let me start with the claim that capitalists cannot be identified with ‘the
bourgeoisie’. This is the same argument that Partha Chatterjee used in his riposte, and I will respond to it only briefly, referring the interested reader to my fuller treatment of his argument elsewhere (Chibber 2014a; 2014b).
Here is what is at stake. Guha castigates the Indian bourgeoisie for failing to integrate the subaltern domain with that of the elites, and, in this, falling short of the historic achievements of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe. I show that the
bourgeoise in England and France never aspired to, or strove for, the goals that Guha ascribes to them, and that, in fact, they were as contemptuous of subaltern interests as their later Indian counterparts. The question here is: what does Guha
mean by ‘bourgeoisie’? I show in PTSC that he means ‘capitalists’, and I offer more evidence for this in subsequent work (Chibber 2014a). Spivak now claims that ‘bourgeoisie’ means lawyers, and intellectuals, not capitalists. But, however
Spivak may wish to define the concept, it is abundantly clear that when Guha uses it he simply refers to capitalists. Spivak is creating an entirely fictitious Guha here, one who only exists in her imagination.


As to my elision of the difference between capital and capitalism, let me start by cautioning the reader that, pace Spivak, there is no established convention regarding the distinction. Usually, ‘capital’ is taken to mean ‘capitalists’, people whose actions propel the accumulation process, whereas ‘capitalism’ is used to denote the properties of the social structure in which these actors are located. But there is plenty of room for theorists to take some licence with how they use these terms. So when scholars intend to deploy the two as distinct concepts, they usually alert the reader to what each one is supposed to convey. Otherwise, one usually has to glean the intention of the writer by more indirect means, attending to the context, the apparent intention, the place of the argument, etc. It is not uncommon for the two to be used interchangeably.
Guha nowhere introduces the distinction in a systematic way and hence never tells us what he means by the two terms. The reader has to infer their meaning by attending to the context. What we do know is that the entity that is supposed to have had its universalizing mission derailed is ‘capital’. But, depending on the context, this expression can mean either capitalists or capitalism. So, for example, it can mean, ‘When capitalists came to India they did not pursue the same goals as they did in England’; or it can mean, ‘The capitalism that took root in India did not expand in the same way that it had in England.’ Guha usually has in mind the first claim when he makes his argument—he is usually referring to political or economic aspirations of the capitalist class. But sometimes he means the second. More importantly, since the two are closely related, the gap between them is not
that large. None of this is either very deep or mysterious. If Spivak feels that I have misunderstood Guha because I elide the distinction, she needs to show that such is the case. In normal academic discourse, when such an accusation is made, the critic offers some evidence to substantiate it by adducing key passages that have been misunderstood, showing how the
argument has been distorted through the elision. Spivak clearly acknowledges that I am aware of the distinction between capital and capitalism, so she cannot think that I am blind to it (2014, 191). Which of its subtleties, then, do I miss? I
confess that her argument here is almost impossible to understand. The only clear instance she adduces of an apparent elision is when she quotes me as asking: what does capitalism universalize? She then quotes me answering it with reference to
capital, not capitalism (Spivak 2014, 187). So apparently I have substituted one for the other. But I am not doing any such thing. What I say is: capitalism imposes a certain logic upon capital, and by ‘capital’ I mean capitalists. Hence, the structural
location of certain actors forces a particular strategy of economic reproduction upon them. I am not ignoring a distinction here; I am in fact utilizing it. The only confusion here is on Spivak’s part.


‘Little Britain Marxism’


Spivak’s only other significant accusation is that my book is a defence of a narrow, boxed-set kind of Marxism which refuses to budge from its orthodoxies. This has become a quite common refrain from postcolonial critics of the book. It is not
unusual to see my case against the Subalternists as being that they ‘are not Marxist enough’, or that they are wrong because they have the ‘wrong kind of Marxism’. The idea is that I simply hold up their arguments to a fixed set of orthodoxies, and
in instances where they deviate from the latter I reject them out of hand. So the battle is apparently between open-ended, creative Subalternists, trying to expand received theory to make sense of a complex reality, and the stolid, unyielding
Marxists who cast out anyone who dares to question Holy Writ. But the accusation is nonsense. In PTSC, I do not make a single criticism of the Subalternists on the grounds that their work is a deviation from Marxist orthodoxy. Nor do I defend any of my own by proving its closer fidelity to Marx. Each and every argument I make—whether against the Subalternists or in defence
of my own views—is defended on independent grounds, whether empirical or conceptual. There is only one chapter that takes up Marx directly, chapter 6, where I take up the question of abstract labour. Even in this case, I apologize for having to
descend into Marxology (see Chibber 2013, 130), and then try to show that it is worthwhile, not because it was developed by Marx, but because it captures some interesting facts about capitalism. The only other instance in which I bring up
Marxology is in chapter 4, where I criticize Marx for his credulousness towards liberal historiography. Every other argument I make is developed by reference to facts about the world, or conceptual clarification. And every criticism of the Subalternists issues from the same criteria. The arguments offered by Subaltern
Studies are to be rejected because they are wrong, not because they stray from
orthodoxy.
Spivak knows this, and it is why she is worried enough to write her long attack. If the book had just been a Marxist screed against the heretics, it would have died a quiet death. The reason it has attracted attention is precisely because it is not the ‘Little Britain Marxism’ that Spivak accuses it of being, but an examination of Subalternist arguments on their own terms—by attending to the empirical and theoretical strength of their claims. As for Marxism, there is in fact plenty in the received orthodoxy that is either mistaken or questionable. To give some examples: .
.
The orthodox theory of historical materialism is almost certainly wrong (Chibber 2011).
The labour theory of value may very well be wrong, and if it is not, it can only be defended in modified form.
The traditional theory of bourgeois revolutions is definitely wrong, as I explain in great detail in PTSC.
.
Marxism still has a poorly developed moral theory, though that situation is now greatly remedied.
There is quite an extensive literature on these subjects, and I have contributed to some of it, all of which acknowledges and seeks to remedy deep flaws in orthodox formulation. There are plenty of other weaknesses in the theory but I have listed
these only because they are considered to be at the very heart of Marxist orthodoxy. So it is not that Marxist theory is not in need of serious modification, or that it does not have severe weaknesses. It is just that, whatever weaknesses it has, they are not the ones targeted by postcolonial theorists. The biggest problem with postcolonial theory is that it seeks to undermine the very areas of Marxist theory that ought to be retained, that are in fact its strengths—the reality of capitalist constraints, regardless of culture; the reality of human nature; the centrality of certain universal aspirations on the part of the oppressed, which issue from this human nature; the need for abstract, universal concepts that are valid across cultures; the necessity of rational, reasoned discourse, etc. And the reason these propositions need to be defended is not that they comprise a doctrine that Marxists seek to uphold, but because they are defensible on their own merits. It has long been a tactic of postcolonial theorists to offer their framework as not only a direct lineal descendant of Marxist theory— which it is not—but also as the only sustainable version of Marxism—which it is emphatically not. Any criticism of their arguments is thereby impugned as an
unthinking adherence to orthodoxy, or a search for doctrinal purity. Spivak’s characterization of PTSC as ‘Little Britain Marxism’ is but the latest incarnation of this, and readers should not be misled by it.


Conclusion


The sad fact is that, apart from the few points that I have taken up above, there is very little in Spivak’s essay to which one can respond. To be sure, there is no shortage of accusations, some pertaining to exegesis, others to logic or theory. Spivak certainly seems to feel strongly that PTSC is guilty of many sins. But this makes it all the more curious that she expends little or no effort doing what any honest critic would do—taking the time to read the text carefully, locate its flaws, demonstrate to the reader that the argument is indeed guilty of the mistakes of which it is accused.
Indeed, what stands out most about the essay is how it eschews the normal protocols of scholarship in favour of other, less savoury tactics. And I would be remiss to say nothing about it, since it is so egregious. There is a very powerful authoritarian thrust in Spivak’s essay. It is not just the deferential attitude that one is supposed to display towards certain texts and authorities. It is not just the exalted status of ‘primary texts’. A required genuflection to authority pervades the text. It is surprising to find repeated references to someone’s age—the fact that Guha is 90 years old—or to their storied past, or to their fame in the intellectual world, or to their social work during the summer. These are not random facts that Spivak offers the reader; they are bits of information doled out to contrast the worthiness of some people—Guha and Spivak in this case—in contrast to the
brash, ‘boyish’ critic who is obsessed with ‘correcting everybody’, a ‘correct-fetishist’, as she refers to me. Spivak seems genuinely perturbed, not by the substance of my criticism, but by the very act of it. I am upbraided for not being reviews
sufficiently awestruck by the distinction of those whom I have targeted for criticism. The imperious tone, the constant reminder of status, whether based on age or of academic and social standing, is quite shocking to witness in an academic paper. The only place I have ever seen it before was while growing up in India, where it was used with servants and children to remind them of their place in the order of things.


Perhaps this may explain why Spivak does not bother to base her arguments on evidence or logic. Evidence matters if you are trying to persuade someone through argument, not appeals to authority. Spivak, however, writes in the manner of someone long accustomed to treating those around her as supplicants, not colleagues. One would not be much concerned with this, were it not for the fact that at least two generations of students have been socialized into this kind of practice. I doubt that Spivak’s style of engagement would be tolerated in any other discipline. So much the worse for postcolonial studies.


References


Chatterjee, Partha (2013) ‘Subaltern studies and capital’, Economic and Political Weekly, 14 September, 69 – 75
Chibber, Vivek (2011) ‘What is living and what is dead in the Marxist theory of history’, Historical Materialism, 19:2, 60 – 91
Chibber, Vivek (2013) Postcolonial theory and the specter of capital (New York: Verso)
Chibber, Vivek (2014a) ‘Revisiting postcolonial studies’, Economic and Political Weekly, 9 March 2014, 82 – 85
Chibber, Vivek (2014b) ‘Subaltern studies revisited—a (longer) reply to Partha Chatterjee’, ,http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/object/vivekchibber.html., accessed 9 June 2014
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorti (2014) ‘Review of Postcolonial theory and the specter of capital’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 27:1, 184– 198
Vivek Chibber q 2014 New York University
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.943593
Notes on contributor
Vivek Chibber (PhD, University of Wisconsin) is a professor of sociology at New York University, and the author of Postcolonial theory and the specter of capital (Verso, 2013).

 

1 This essay is a author response to a review previously published by this journal (Spivak 2014, 184– 198).

2 Both concepts originate in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.

3 See Chatterjee (2013). For a rebuttal of Chatterjee, see Chibber (2014a) and especially
Chibber (2014b), where I provide detailed textual evidence against his claims

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